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Vulnerable Infrastructure, Election, 2024
Photo credit: Matt Wiebe / Flickr (CC BY 2.0 DEED), Raquel Baranow / Flickr (CC BY-SA 2.0 DEED), Ralph.Torello / Flickr (PDM 1.0 DEED), ERIC SALARD / Flickr (CC BY-SA 2.0 DEED), Jefferson Lab / Flickr (PDM 1.0 DEED), and Maryland GovPics / Flickr (CC BY 2.0 DEED).

A RAND report’s chilling predictions for the 2024 election — infrastructure hacks, AI disinfo, a lack of voting machine security — show the risks are worse than we thought.

Imagine a small, seemingly innocuous hack on a local water treatment plant. A carefully timed disinformation campaign, powered by the latest in artificial intelligence. The physical security of our voting machines compromised. Suddenly, we have the perfect storm that could bring down the integrity of the entire 2024 presidential election and our democracy along with it

This isn’t just a hypothetical scenario — it’s a very real possibility outlined in a chilling new report from the RAND Corporation, titled, The 2024 U.S. Election, Trust, and Technology: Preparing for a Perfect Storm of Threats to Democracy.

On this week’s WhoWhatWhy podcast, we sit down with the lead author of that report, military sociologist Marek N. Posard, to examine these alarming threats and what we can do to counter them.

Posard paints a disturbing picture of the multifaceted dangers our election system faces, from the physical to the psychological. He reveals how a single vulnerability, exploited at just the right moment, could bring the entire democratic process to its knees, even before the votes are counted.

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Full Text Transcript:

(As a service to our readers, we provide transcripts with our podcasts. We try to ensure that these transcripts do not include errors. However, due to a constraint of resources, we are not always able to proofread them as closely as we would like and hope that you will excuse any errors that slipped through.)

Jeff Schechtman: Welcome to this edition of the WhoWhatWhy podcast. I’m your host, Jeff Schechtman. As the 2024 presidential election looms on the horizon, a perfect storm of threats is brewing, poised to challenge the very integrity of our democratic process. From sophisticated cyberattacks targeting our election infrastructure to disinformation campaigns designed to sow discord and doubt, the risks are manifold and the stakes couldn’t be higher.

To help us navigate this treacherous landscape, I’m joined today by Marek Posard, a military sociologist at the RAND Corporation, and the lead author of a groundbreaking new report titled The 2024 U.S. Election, Trust, and Technology: Preparing for a Perfect Storm of Threats to Democracy. Marek and his colleagues’ work offers a comprehensive assessment of the multifaceted dangers that we face, from threats to the physical security of our voting machines, to the psychological warfare being waged on the minds of the electorate. His analysis also delves into the alarming potential of artificial intelligence to supercharge these threats, amplifying the reach and impact of disinformation like never before.

But this report goes beyond just sounding an alarm. He and his team have crafted a set of strategic recommendations and scenarios to help policymakers and election officials anticipate, prevent, and mitigate these risks. It’s a roadmap for safeguarding a most sacred democratic institution in the face of unprecedented challenges. The report examines the real-world implications of these threats and outlines the urgent actions that must be taken as a nation to weather the coming storm.

Marek’s primary research areas include countering disinformation, security clearance vetting, and studying personnel working within military organizations. It is my pleasure to welcome Marek Posard here to the WhoWhatWhy podcast. Marek, thanks so much for joining us.

Marek Posard: Thank you so much.

Jeff: One of the things that is probably the most frightening when we look at this whole panoply of threats, is this idea that we’re not facing a single threat or a couple of threats, that it is essentially this perfect storm of threats that is upon us coming from different areas. Talk about that generally first.

Marek: So there’s various types of crises that can hit our country at any given time. There can be hacking of pipelines, hacking of healthcare systems, student protests, you name it. And we have a political system that promotes competition, particularly between two parties, but our adversaries have gotten quite good at injecting themselves into our politics and essentially recycling our partisanship at scale. And so when we have different crises happening simultaneously, it is just a great opportunity for our adversaries, from their perspective, to exploit and make it seem like we’re fighting each other when in reality they’re trying to amplify our preexisting differences that can be found within our society.

Jeff: Explain a bit about where these threats are coming from, because you talk about multiple threats — physical threats, disinformation threats, threats coming from machines themselves. Detail that a little bit.

Marek: So we outline these, we call them asset classes essentially. There’s physical infrastructure such as voting machines, computer systems, and ballots. There’s human capital, essentially the people who work in the election system. And then there’s reputational assets with our election system, and that can involve public perceptions of having free and fair elections. And there can be crises that kind of pop up or are tangentially related to those assets.

What happens is when they are happening simultaneously or even when there’s one crisis in one type of asset — so maybe there’s someone in one state who is working in a local election claiming there’s fraud when there isn’t fraud, and then our adversaries potentially can use that to amplify other types of potential threats, real or non-existent, to essentially create this storm over time.

And it can happen in a lot of different ways, but I think the important thing to remember is that a threat to our ballots or mail-in ballots or physical infrastructure, and those working on the infrastructure, and then the reputational damage — they can all get mishmashed over time. And if there’s a crisis that’s not even related to elections that pops up, it just creates an opportunity to start sowing doubt and conflict surrounding it.

Jeff: One of the other aspects is that the nature of our system itself creates an environment in which we have to look for threats that are happening not just on a national level with respect to disinformation, but also on state levels and local levels because of the way our elections are conducted.

Marek: You’re right. And actually, I’ve called this the paradox of federalized elections. Because we have a very decentralized election system in the United States, it’s really hard for our adversaries to successfully hack our elections, which are run at so many different local jurisdictions across all these different states. But it’s actually really easy to make it seem like they’re being hacked, essentially, because you just need one example that you can amplify.

And I think that a potential threat we have to think about is it can be just one example, one photo that’s taken out of context, one manipulated image or video — and then you can try to essentially amplify that across the country and make it seem like there’s this national threat when in reality it might just be a one-off situation or a completely falsified event and falsified evidence. And so there’s an interesting paradox, I think, that exists with our election system.

Jeff: Because many of these threats are new in terms of where they’re coming from and the quantity of them, it seems that we don’t really have the appropriate historical context to begin to think about how to deal with them, either individually because some of them are new, or collectively because there’s so many.

Marek: So we’ve had these issues in the past, but they’re a bit different. The Soviets were quite good at doing this kind of stuff to the US. They were never successful, but they had a pretty sophisticated state infrastructure designed to amplify race differences within our country, particularly during the ’60s and ’70s, amplifying inequality issues during the 1980s. What I think is different today is the technology component. The cost of doing this is really low, and so it’s easy for anybody to essentially start trying to exploit falsehoods in the election system or amplify these surrounding crises, and you don’t need a giant bureaucracy to do it.

And that’s why we’re seeing countries like Russia, China, Iran, and other types of groups just getting in on the game, because you don’t have to have a huge upfront investment. And I think that’s where artificial intelligence comes in. It just lowers the cost of pumping out garbage to try to amplify crises and try to link crises together to essentially undermine the reputation of our elections among our fellow citizens.

Jeff: Talk about artificial intelligence and the things that you think might be playing out in this upcoming election that haven’t happened before, because of the ability of AI now.

Marek: So I’m a bit of a contrarian on AI. I think there’s some people who think AI is an existential risk to our world, and I push back on those claims. What I do think is happening is that it creates an opportunity to pump out a lot of crap. And when you have more of what is basically pollution in the information space, it gets harder and harder for regular Americans and citizens to sort out fact from fiction and try to figure out where there actually is a constructive political debate versus someone trying to amplify one side over the other.

And so I think my concern with artificial intelligence is that the sheer content that’s going to be produced, particularly during the election cycle, is going to make it harder and harder for people to actually find the right information to have that constructive debate and find connections with people with whom they may disagree on certain policy issues.

Jeff: To what extent is our polarization today—  I mean, elections are always partisan, but the degree to which we are so deeply polarized today, and one side seems more interested in election interference, talk about the role that plays in this whole rubric we’re talking about.

Marek: It creates tactical opportunities for adversaries. So we’ve had in our country’s history various types of vicissitudes where we shift between various types of policy issues. My personal opinion, as a sociologist, is that we’re probably going through a political realignment. Those are awkward, and what it means to be Republican and Democrat are changing slowly before our eyes.

But those create opportunities, particularly for our adversaries to interject themselves to amplify differences to try to make connections to various types of other unrelated topics that can essentially further divide us. And the more that we can figure out how to shine light on that without interjecting ourselves into those political debates, I think the healthier democracy is going to be.

Jeff: When we think about these potential threats and the way they come together in this perfect storm that we’ve been talking about and that you talk about in the report, are there unknowns that we just can’t imagine at this point relative to the way some of these things may interact?

Marek: Oh, for sure, and I think that’s where the scenario planning comes in. It needs to be conditionalized. And by conditionalized I mean not making a 100 percent forecast that this is what’s going to happen, but understanding how a threat or a potential hacking — for example, on a utility infrastructure — could actually have impacts on how election is carried out, which then in turn could maybe potentially lead to various sets of partisan lawsuits surrounding election outcomes and voter fraud or whatnot.

And I think that’s where the unthinkable comes in, because it’s really hard to forecast how these crises that pop up that seemingly aren’t related, suddenly turn into an election thing. And I think one thing I will just note is that I led RAND’s work on the 2020 election for Governor Newsom and the California Office of Emergency Services. And one thing that we found with Russian interference in the 2020 election was: People who have extreme partisan views on the left and the right, they may have those strong partisan views, but they don’t want Russia or any other foreign adversary reaffirming that.

So I think there’s some opportunities to shine light on how adversaries are exploiting this. If it’s done in the right way, I think people on the far right and far left might actually be receptive to understanding it and taking that to heart.

Jeff: Talk about how voters should be looking at this, how the average voter, the average citizen, should be thinking about this.

Marek: I think our political system is set up as a competition between two or more parties. And I think there is a huge infrastructure set up to exploit policy issues, various social issues, to essentially gin up the population. And I think that you can have views on the right and the left. The question is, are people trying to manipulate those views and to what end? And I think skepticism is important, but it has to be balanced skepticism and assume that those on the right and the left are trying to potentially manipulate one’s beliefs, whatever their beliefs might be, and also have a healthy dose of skepticism that our adversities might be trying to amplify that themselves.

And I think skepticism that’s balanced is healthy but also not delving into conspiracy theories and these other kinds of extremes. I think the vital center holds true in American politics, and the more that we can have that balanced perspective and being skeptical of both extremes, I think is probably a healthy way to approach any types of content that people are consuming as we lead up to the 2024 election.

Jeff: But even avoiding the extremes, we see that as time goes on, public confidence in the election system, as part of public confidence loss in institutions generally, really exacerbates so much of this.

Marek: Exactly. And this is where we have to, I think, remember that these are all very localized elections. There’s not some massive “deep state”; that is, the Department of Homeland Security and the Intelligence Committee are not directly involved in the execution of elections. These are the League of Women Voters. These are your neighbors. It’s people associated with your local city council. And I think the more that we localize this and think of it as a localized phenomenon, which it really is, I think the more we can bring down the temperature.

Our politics are increasingly nationalized in this country. And I think there’s a lot of issues, particularly as it relates to election administration, that are local issues. There is no central command of our election system. It’s very decentralized and localized. These are your neighbors. They’re the elderly woman that lives across the street from you who’s volunteering her time to help be a poll worker. In some ways I think the localization might be an interesting antidote to bring down the temperature on some of this stuff.

Jeff: Why isn’t there more conversation about that very fact, that the sense of localization, the experience people have that go into vote and that see their neighbors and see the people from the League of Women Voters and see the volunteers that are at polling places? This is a universal experience in red states and blue states, but that reality that you are talking about doesn’t get talked about enough in the nationalization conversation.

Marek: I think it doesn’t really score you political points and gin up a base to get them to turn out. I think talking about how an election is successful because your neighbors and the League of Women Voters volunteered their time to essentially do their civic duty, that’s not something that’s going to hit CNN at 8 PM or 9 PM on a weekday. And in fact, if you look at— we had in the report looked at public confidence in the honesty of US elections, and it tends to be correlated with who’s in office and one’s political partisanship.

And so we see that Republicans had lot of faith in our elections back in 2000 and 2004. And so I think we have to remember that there’s a partisan angle and there is a national political effort to essentially gin up the population. And I think that it’s going to be a hard one to push back on.

Jeff: Talk a little bit about process, the machines themselves, the various voting systems, and the lack of confidence and the concern about those systems, some of which has been ginned up over the past several years, and some of which goes back to a lot of concern about this that’s been going on for 20-plus years.

Marek: I think the issue is that every state has their own process, and in many cases it’s very localized. And so it’s easy to find one jurisdiction or one state where the process might not be as efficient or effective, but it also makes it hard for one jurisdiction that has maybe a little bit sloppier of a process to really affect the overall election.

And I think this is where we need to make discussions of the 2024 election more boring in some cases. Where are the areas where there’s lessons learned? Where can we improve on the mechanics without throwing around these wild claims that there’s a vast conspiracy that someone stealing the election, when in reality it just might be a situation of resourcing? It might be a situation of just government bureaucracies needing to refine their standard operating procedures. These aren’t sexy topics, but they’re also not a conspiracy.

And I think that’s where we get lost in the conversation, because there might be a situation where in one jurisdiction, they don’t necessarily lock up the voting machines in the same way that they may be should in another state. That doesn’t mean anyone’s stealing an election! That just means there might need to be a refinement in standard operating procedure. And rest assured, because we have this decentralized election system, we have a pretty robust and resilient system for any type of attempts to try to hack the elections or interfere with the elections.

Jeff: What about the companies themselves that provide this equipment? That pot gets smaller and smaller and smaller. We have fewer and fewer companies that are doing this.

Marek: It’s not a huge market for election equipment, so to speak. It’s not like there’s a constant churn of people buying election equipment. So it makes sense or there might be a few key players, but there are pretty robust systems in place. I have colleagues who do more of this type of work than I do who can talk about that, but we do have a pretty robust system at the federal, state, and local levels that do review these things and ensure that these systems are secure and they’re effective in what they’re supposed to do.

Jeff: Talk a little bit about the things that you most worry about, the things that we can imagine that you think should be of the greatest concern to people.

Marek: My biggest concern is how a small problem at a local level could turn into a national issue. Where there might be some kind of crisis — it could be a situation where there’s a natural disaster, there’s a pandemic, there is a bridge collapse, whatever it might be, that then leads to an impact on our elections. And it’s a localized issue that local officials are trying to deal with in the immediate term, but suddenly it becomes a national issue, and then it’s turned into something that’s claiming there’s widespread voter fraud.

And what’s really unfortunate about those kinds of situations is there are unique problems that can hit our state and local officials in a very fast manner. And it’s not always clear what the solution is, but it’s not indicative of a national trend. But it becomes a national story overnight, and it’s not particularly productive.

And I think what could happen is some claims about voter fraud or claims about voter suppression that might be tied to this — again, a small localized natural disaster or tornado or earthquake, a bridge collapsing, like we saw in Baltimore — can then turn into the claims that are fueling a larger national political debate. And that national political debate is really not directly related to what’s happening on the ground to real people. And as a result, it’s actually doing reputational damage to all the other local elections across the country.

Jeff: Isn’t that the essence— it wasn’t a natural disaster, but the essence of what happened in Florida in 2000?

Marek: Exactly. Exactly. And I think that’s a situation where there might be limitations and deficiencies in how elections are carried out, particularly with the ballots, but that doesn’t mean that that’s happening across all states. And again, the nationalization— a realization of what’s happening in Florida can lead to pretty unproductive conversations where we’re not actually solving the problem at hand; we’re actually just using this as fodder for making other types of nationalized political points.

Jeff: Was Florida 2000 a tipping point in terms of faith and confidence in elections?

Marek: I think it was a key touch point because I think what it started to do in 2000 was raise questions about, essentially, the physical infrastructure of our elections. And what we note in the report is that started to expand. So they started to raise questions not only about the physical infrastructure, but certain questions being raised at a national level about the human assets involved, the people who run the elections, and people associated with getting the turnout. An example we use is the scandal surrounding ACORN back in the early 2000s.

And now what we’re seeing is something much broader, this broader reputational damage that seems to be occurring, where it’s not just claims about one state and one voting machine or one group of people or issues surrounding voter ID. It’s now mishmashing these together to claim that the entire election process in the US is faulted, that it creates people getting elected that shouldn’t be elected. There’s no evidence of this. And I think that’s the difference. In 2000, it highlighted one particular concern that got nationalized, and now what we’re seeing is expanding scope of these concerns that are not necessarily attached to reality.

Jeff: Talk about this underlying debate with respect to some people on the one hand arguing for better and greater technology in the voting process, that we have the ability to do that, and then on the other side the argument for essentially hand marked and counted ballots.

Marek: I think this is where we need to make our elections boring again. I think we have to be careful about rolling out new technology as if technology’s going to be this panacea, because we already have a sizable percentage of the population that doesn’t have a lot of faith in our elections. And so I think there is, going back to the hand [marked] ballots, I think they are important for having a written record. That doesn’t mean you shouldn’t explore other types of modalities.

But I think this is where we have to have very conditional trials to see what works and what doesn’t work and have the important safeguards in place. It’s not sexy, it’s not something that’s going to change overnight. I think this is where you try to look at where technology can amplify our existing processes, but you don’t start throwing the baby out with the bath water.

Jeff: And with respect to this, what role does the media need to play as you see it?

Marek: I do think that there’s a need for more local news coverage and a focus on localized news. It’s easy, particularly in an election year, to nationalize stuff. And it makes it easy when candidates might try to jump on that bandwagon. The truth of the matter is, I think there’s a role for local media where you’re talking about what’s going on on the ground, you’re talking about who’s involved in the election system. You’re normalizing it insofar as that you’re highlighting it is your neighbors, it’s your friends, it’s your family members.

It isn’t some distal government official that you don’t know whom they work for, where they live. The more that we can localize coverage, I think the better. I think it’s going to be bringing down the temperature and some of this stuff that really isn’t tied to reality.

Jeff: Of course, that may be part of the problem because local media has essentially been hollowed out everywhere.

Marek: Oh, exactly. And I think there’s an important dimension to the role of local media. So at RAND, we talk about this general trend called truth decay, the decline of facts and objectivity, and policy analysis and our public discourse. There’s an important role in local media to not only cover what’s going on in the ground in your local, for example, municipality, but it’s also covering these social dimensions, the social capital in your community. It’s the local lunch lady and there’s public interest stories about neighbors helping each other.

And I think we don’t get as much of that anymore because so much of our media is nationalized, and that’s true for elections too. There’s a lot of civic engagement that is really virtually volunteer work or it’s very low paid, essentially it is volunteer work with maybe a small stipend. And I think we don’t give enough coverage to that, and so it’s easy to get sucked into a grand political narrative when the reality is these are very localized phenomenon, and I think people forget that.

Jeff: Just to stay with that a moment. Is that part of the problem that we have seen evolve over the past many years, as local media has been hollowed out — as local media, local newspapers have disappeared, local coverage on radio has disappeared — that that corresponds with and has gone along the same path as distrust in elections that have become more and more nationalized in terms of the way they’re covered?

Marek: It’s an empirical question. I mean, my hypothesis would be yes. I think there’s just more opportunities to gin people up. And I think there’s just more avenues to do it. There’s more avenues to pick up on and pull on a thread that really is maybe just a localized thread and turn it into a national narrative. And I think one thing that I would just say is that there are a lot of different interested folks, both domestically and abroad, trying to gin up the American populace, particularly during this election year.

And I think we all would be a bit healthier as a society and democracy if we approach both sides with some skepticism. And that includes domestic actors and foreign actors. I think local media actually, it’s not nationalized. It doesn’t always get plugged into these national political stories. And I think actually that’s a pretty strong antidote to some of this stuff.

Jeff: Does, in fact, there need to be better and stronger leadership on this issue? And where do you think that needs to come from?

Marek: I mean, ideally the parties would have an infrastructure in place to essentially corral the messaging, so to speak, so they don’t go to any extreme that’s not based on evidence. My working hypothesis, again, is that we’re probably going through a political realignment, and so you’re seeing these populist elements pop up both on the right and the left. And so we’re trying to sort out what it means to be a Democrat and Republican right now. It’s awkward, it’s uncomfortable, it’s unclear. My hope is that this will get sorted out soon enough.

We go through these political realignments every 30 or so years in the United States. But hopefully the political parties then can figure out where there are bases, and what they can do is essentially be more focused on the policy issues at hand. And that includes domestic issues, like claims about election fraud and election security. I think we’re just seeing— there’s less discussion of that policy area because I think the politics of it is so mishmashed right now because I think we are going through realignment. But that’s just my hypothesis.

Jeff: And is this amped up because of the closeness of our elections today? The fact that we are so divided, both in states and nationally, that these elections are so close that for the winners and losers, the margins are so thin.

Marek: Yes. And I think that goes back to the realignment issue, where I think both parties are trying to figure out what it means to be a Democrat and a Republican. And you’re seeing right now the— the fact that there’s just so many individuals self-reporting themselves as Independents and not as a Republican or a Democrat, I think is a perfect example of this. They have both parties trying to fight for that independent block of voters. And so the margins are quite, quite small. And as a result, parties are trying to figure out how to essentially maximize their voter base.

And so it’s a game of trial and error. And again, it’s awkward. But we’ve gone through this before. We’ve gone through this in the ’70s, we’ve gone through this in the early 1900s. This isn’t the first time the country’s gone through these kinds of changes. It’s just a matter of trying to get the parties more focused on, I think, an evidence-based approach on all these policy issues, which includes elections.

Jeff: Do we need more federal legislation to address any of these things that are an extension of perhaps the old Help America Vote Act?

Marek: I think that’s one policy lever. I do think we have a history of having a federalized election system. So insofar as the federal government can have a supporting role to our local elections, it is going to be key. I think this is a question where we have to have an objective evidence-based discussion of what specific measures need to be occurring. I would argue, for example, that there’s a handful of states where the vote margins are likely to be pretty narrow. I live in the state of Maryland. No one’s claiming the state of Maryland there’s widespread voter fraud because it’s pretty much a Democratic stronghold. Same thing with California.

But there’s certain states where the margins are pretty thin. Wisconsin, Michigan, Pennsylvania, those are states where I think we might want to look at how can the federal government better invest in ensuring there are safeguards to make it really hard for anyone to claim there’s voter fraud. That’s a pretty easy win. That doesn’t mean the federal government’s taking over elections, but it’s basically subsidizing the infrastructure in those states because we know that there’s going to be a likely small vote margin. And as a result, there’s just going to be a greater chance that someone can make a claim of election fraud versus states that are going to be pretty much guaranteed to be voting one party or another.

Jeff: And finally, talk about what you see as a potential worst-case scenario.

Marek: The worst-case scenario is I think there could be non-state actors that target our critical infrastructure. And then we have Russia, China, and Iran, either coordinated or uncoordinated, essentially piggybacking on that crisis. And then on top of that, you have a situation where the Republican and Democratic presidential candidates are responding in ways that essentially give our adversaries abroad even more ammunition to try to amplify the differences.

And so my worry is there’ll be some critical infrastructure that’s attacked — the water supply, it could be some type of hacking of our internet infrastructure, our electrical grid — right around election time. And then there’s, all of a sudden, all sorts of stuff being pumped out by Russia, China, Iran, and others claiming that these are partisan efforts to essentially sway the vote, and then it gets our political parties hooked in, and then they start taking the lead. And essentially, it’s not even our adversaries pushing out falsehoods anymore; they’re just trying to get our own domestic political groups to take it on their own and let it rip. And that’s my biggest concern.

Jeff: And how do you think something like that plays out?

Marek: I think it starts small. It starts small with one critical infrastructure in a swing state being attacked, and then all of a sudden, you start seeing a social media campaign that might be run out of the Russian Federation pumping out content that starts claiming this is election fraud, and then maybe Iran gets involved in some way, shape or form, where they might hack a critical infrastructure or election infrastructure in the same state. And then all of a sudden, you have candidates making claims — or perhaps not even the candidates, it could just be their related super-PACs.

And so it’s one of these things where it doesn’t seem like it’s an election-related issue, and then suddenly, it just takes a life of its own.

And if our adversaries are essentially recycling our partisanship at scale, they’re just trying to get us to fight with each other. And then it turns into a situation where there’s widespread doubt, not only in that one swing state but across the country, that can lead to some pretty extreme activity. Either through disparate groups of individuals that are not tied to a political party, or there might be a whole slew of litigation that just starts coming down the pike, various types of states making various types of claims that are not founded, not based on reality.

Jeff: And there really is very little defense against that, or at least what begins the process.

Marek: What I think the defense is, again, going back to scenario-based planning where you essentially are trying to game this out, and I do think there’s a handful of states where we know the vote margin is going to be very small. And the more that we — essentially the federal government — can invest in those states early on, so they have systems in place to prepare for alternative scenarios that might emerge, they have systems in place to immediately audit these votes, to essentially increase the costs for someone trying to claim that the election was stolen, make it as hard as possible for people to make those claims.

And that’s really just having enough investment in states like Arizona, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Michigan. So if you want to make a claim that an election was stolen, you can make that claim, but it’s going to be really hard to demonstrate proof that that actually happened. And we’re going to button those up as much as we can.

Jeff: Marek Posard, I thank you so very much for spending time with us today here on the WhoWhatWhy podcast.

Marek: Yes. Thank you very much.

Jeff: Thank you. And thank you for listening and joining us here on the WhoWhatWhy podcast. I hope you join us next week for another radio WhoWhatWhy podcast. I’m Jeff Schechtman. If you like this podcast, please feel free to share and help others find it by rating and reviewing it on iTunes. You can also support this podcast and all the work we do by going to whowhatwhy.org/donate.


Author

  • Jeff Schechtman

    Jeff Schechtman’s career spans movies, radio stations and podcasts. After spending twenty-five years in the motion picture industry as a producer and executive, he immersed himself in journalism, radio, and more recently the world of podcasts. To date he has conducted over ten-thousand interviews with authors, journalists, and thought leaders. Since March of 2015, he has conducted over 315 podcasts for WhoWhatWhy.org

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