The 'Atlantic' published a more complete version of the controversial Signal group chat proving that the cabinet discussion indeed should have been classified.
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Jeffrey Goldberg, the Atlantic magazine editor who inadvertently sat in on a group Cabinet discussion that was using an unsecure Signal app, is coming under criticism from both the left and the right.
Trump supporters think Goldberg should have warned Donald Trump’s Cabinet members that he was a fly on the wall. More progressive critics suggest that Goldberg — who dropped out of the conversation, into which he had been mysteriously invited, once he realized that it was dealing with a highly classified subject — should have stayed online and listened to the whole thing.
Trump and his newly appointed director of national intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard, both claim unconvincingly that nothing said during the conversation was actually classified. That strains credulity since the group chat was called to decide whether the US Navy should bomb Houthi rebels in Yemen.
The Houthis have been attacking ships on sea lanes that provide access to the Suez Canal. Trump clearly wanted the bombing to take place. Vice President JD Vance, who was part of the chat, suggested that the bombing would contradict Trump’s message of showing disdain for Europe, since 40 percent of the ship traffic going through the canal services Europe and only 3 percent of the traffic is for the US.
In the chat, the group decided when the US should strike the Houthis, and how severe the bombing should be. The reason that both Gabbard, who is supposed to be overseeing US intelligence activities, and Trump denied that any of the discussion was classified is that the whole conversation took place over an internet application that is not only not secure but is also believed to have been hacked by Russian computer experts who have been trying to break into it on a regular basis in order to intercept conversations about the war in Ukraine.
Why Gabbard, supposedly the connection for all top intelligence flowing into the US, didn’t know that is anyone’s guess. Ditto for JD Vance, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, and the other participants — and of course for Trump, who later said he was completely unaware that the discussion had taken place.
The obvious question is why these top Cabinet members would use an insecure communications system when the US government, and more specifically the National Security Agency (NSA), has some of the most advanced encryption software in the world. A likely answer seems to be that Trump’s administration still sees the actual US government as potentially hostile.
Goldberg’s decision to drop out of the conversation once he realized what it was about probably made sense. He had no intention of publishing classified information, and even mentioning the group chat might have been problematic under the Espionage Act, which makes it a crime to receive unauthorized classified information that might affect US national security.
Besides that, Goldberg quickly realized that the real story was the manner in which Trump’s Cabinet appointees, who have already come under intense scrutiny over whether they are actually qualified, were cavalierly ignoring the basic requirement for handling sensitive information that could endanger US national security.
The fact that they were making attack plans on Signal, already the target for intelligence collection by hostile foreign intelligence agencies, pretty well answered any question one might have about the group’s competence. Trump’s reaction was to try to dismiss the whole thing as people just learning their job.
The obvious question is why these top Cabinet members would use an insecure communications system when the US government, and more specifically the National Security Agency (NSA), has some of the most advanced encryption software in the world.
A likely answer seems to be that Trump’s administration still sees the actual US government as potentially hostile.
In short, it doesn’t want the NSA, CIA, or FBI, all of which it still considers to be part of its conspiratorial idea of the “Deep State,” to know what it is doing. It would rather take a chance on communicating through a system owned and operated by a nebulous nongovernment organization than take a chance on letting other parts of what used to be the US government in on what it is doing.
That’s one possible explanation. The participants make it clear that they aren’t ready to let their true motives be known.
The other interesting question is who included Jeffrey Goldberg in the group, and why. Was it an accident? Or did someone with a pretty high clearance of their own decide that it would be a good idea to let the general public have a glimpse of how manfully the Trump administration was defending our national security? (It’s worth noting that no high-ranking military officials were present during the deliberations.)
During the conversation, Vance dismissed the American public’s knowledge of world events by observing that the average American probably had no idea of who or what a Houthi was. Before bombing them, Vance suggested, maybe it would be wise to launch a public education campaign to let Americans know who our enemies are.
Vance also made it clear that he doesn’t think of Europeans as good allies because, among other things, they don’t pay the full cost of their own defense (leaving the US to pick up the tab). In fact, he saw no reason to do any more to protect their Suez Canal shipping lanes unless there is, literally, a financial return on the cost of such an action.
Hegseth agreed with Vance that “free-loading” European countries were essentially “PATHETIC.” He nevertheless said that hesitating on the bombing might appear indecisive. Vance, who clearly didn’t care one way or another, immediately reversed himself and endorsed bombing the Houthis in Yemen. Trump later said the bombing turned out brilliantly.
However, even the brief glimpse that Goldberg managed to obtain of the Trump administration’s defense-intelligence leadership could prove extremely useful to nations hostile to the United States. It permitted profiling of the different players: Who was assertive, who tended to be passive, who was ready to change their opinion the minute they suspected the wind was changing, and, of course, who was so lax and unaware of basic security precautions that their intentions and future actions could pretty much be read as an open book.
