Saudi Arabia Sends Mixed Signals Concerning Iran - WhoWhatWhy Saudi Arabia Sends Mixed Signals Concerning Iran - WhoWhatWhy

Mohammad Ali al-Husseini
Mohammad Ali al-Husseini Photo credit: WAM via James Dorsey

The controversial Lebanese Shiite cleric Mohammad Ali al-Husseini has emerged as a major obstacle to Saudi efforts to counter Iran’s axis of resistance, especially those in Lebanon.

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Mohammad Ali al-Husseini personifies the complexity of escalating tensions tearing the Middle East apart. Al-Husseini, a controversial Lebanese Shiite cleric and onetime associate of Hassan Nasrallah, the Hezbollah leader assassinated in an Israeli air strike, has emerged as a major obstacle to Saudi efforts to counter Iran’s axis of resistance, especially those in Lebanon. Once accused of having had contact with Israel’s Mossad, al-Husseini acquired Saudi Arabian citizenship and is regularly seen on Saudi television.

A rash of recent Saudi media appearances featuring al-Husseini suggest that the traditional Saudi-Iranian rivalry is still very much alive despite efforts by both countries to reduce tensions after having reestablished diplomatic relations last year.

Saudi Arabia had previously severed relations with Iran in 2016 after Iranian crowds ransacked its diplomatic missions in protest against the execution of a prominent Shiite cleric. Iran’s newly elected president, Masoud Pezeshkian, would clearly like to move beyond Iran’s past differences with Saudi Arabia.

Meeting Gulf leaders last week at a gathering of Asian nations in Doha, Pezeshkian said, “We consider Islamic countries, including Saudi Arabia, as our brothers, and we emphasize the importance of setting aside differences to enhance cooperation.”

Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan responded, “We aim to permanently close the chapter on our differences and focus on resolving issues, developing relations as two friendly and brotherly countries.” Faisal gave the impression that he agreed with other Gulf leaders intent on reassuring Iran of their neutrality in the Islamic Republic’s conflict with Israel.

The two men spoke amid fears that Iran could attack Gulf oil facilities if Israel strikes at Iranian oil installations in retaliation for Iran’s firing of some 200 ballistic missiles at military and intelligence targets near Tel Aviv.

“The Gulf states think it’s unlikely that Iran will strike their oil facilities, but the Iranians are dropping hints they might from unofficial sources. It’s a tool the Iranians have against the US and the global economy,” said Ali Shihabi, an analyst close to Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.

While relations appeared cordial enough at the diplomatic level, al-Husseini’s appearances on Saudi television seemed to be sending a different message. When Israel extended its campaign into Lebanon, al-Husseini attracted attention by predicting on Saudi television that Israel would assassinate the Hezbollah leader. That was days before he died in an airstrike involving bunker-busting bombs. Al-Husseini advised Nasrallah to draft his will.

Since then, al-Husseini has charged that Iran “sold” Nasrallah to Israel in an apparent attempt to fuel anti-Iranian sentiment among some Hezbollah supporters who accuse Iran of not coming to the group’s aid in its fight with Israel.

Al-Husseini further predicted Israel’s ground offensive days before Israeli troops began crossing the border into Lebanon, suggesting that they would attempt to create a buffer zone.

Al-Husseini’s predictions raised some serious questions about where he was getting his information. Al-Husseini’s conviction by a Lebanese court to five years in prison for having had contacts with Mossad, Israel’s foreign intelligence service, took place more than a decade ago, but the accuracy of his declarations concerning Israeli plans made more than a few critics ask if he didn’t still have access to inside information. 

Al-Husseini’s uncanny knowledge also coincided with Hezbollah’s efforts to figure out how Israel had managed to penetrate Hezbollah’s operations, allowing Israel to disrupt the group’s communications and target its political and military leaders and weapon depots.

Not surprisingly, al-Husseini’s history and favorable attitude towards Israel are fodder for conspiracy theories, even if it is unlikely that he had access to Hezbollah’s inner circle or the group’s sensitive operational information.

Released early from prison as part of a domestic Lebanese political deal, al-Husseini was granted Saudi citizenship in 2021 under a scheme intended to enable Saudi Arabia to compete for foreign talent with the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Singapore.

Al-Husseini sees his naturalization as proof of Saudi pluralism and tolerance.

“The glowing truth that cannot be contested is that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is open to everyone … and does not look at dimensions of … a sectarian type,” he says. His new homeland’s history of discrimination against its Shiite Muslim minority does not seem to bother him.

While his message may be welcome in Saudi Arabia, al-Husseini’s association with the kingdom, coupled with his promotion of Saudi efforts to engage with Jewish communities and his advocacy of relations with Israel as a way of countering Iran’s regional influence, has done little to enhance his credibility with Shiite public opinion in Lebanon and Iraq.

Saudi Arabia, together with the United Arab Emirates, continues to designate Hezbollah as a terrorist organization despite a statement by the Arab League, which includes the Middle East and North Africa’s Arab states, that it no longer considers the Lebanese militia to be terrorists.

Al-Husseini has sought to defuse the controversy by emphasizing his history as a co-founder of Hezbollah. He posts media pictures of himself with Nasrallah on social media, and asserts that he “liberated the South together” with the late Hezbollah leader.

That claim refers to Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000 after 18 years of occupation. Hezbollah is widely seen as having forced Israel to withdraw.

Al-Husseini’s maneuvers are seen as an attempt to capitalize on broader efforts to exploit Hezbollah’s perceived weakness.

With many Lebanese accusing Hezbollah of dragging their country into a war that is not theirs, Hezbollah seems eager to prevent its popular base from eroding. It has signaled its willingness to break Lebanon’s two year-long political stalemate that blocked the appointment of a new president.

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Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, a veteran Shiite Muslim politician empowered by Hezbollah to negotiate on its behalf, opened the door to a resolution by telling acting Prime Minister Najib Mikati he supported the election of a president who doesn’t represent “a challenge” to anyone. Hezbollah’s insistence that Lebanon’s next president should be a Christian ally of the group was one reason the appointment of a new head of state has stalled.

US officials suggested Berri’s offer reflected Hezbollah’s weakened position as a result of Israeli body blows, including Nasrallah’s killing.

“We have made clear for some time that we think the Lebanese government needs to overcome the dysfunction in the system — one of the primary instigators of that dysfunction being the Hezbollah veto over who the next president would be — and elect a president,” said US State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller.

At the same time, a 2023 video resurfaced on social media featuring Hashem Safieddine, one of Nasrallah’s potential successors whom Israel attempted to kill in recent days. The video warns Christians that Hezbollah will not wait indefinitely for them to put forward an acceptable presidential candidate.

“What is being proposed to some Lebanese now, if they don’t grasp it quickly, the time will come when they won’t be able to secure the offer being presented today. It’s better if you hurry; delaying is not in your interest because you lack the leverage…you imagine you have but no longer possess,” Safieddine said a year into the political deadlock.

Safieddine was referring to Lebanon’s demography, which had evolved since 1932 when Christians accounted for 53 percent of the population and Shiite Muslims for 19.7 percent. In 2022, the CIA put Shiite Muslims and Christians at roughly one-third each, with the Maronites constituting the majority among Lebanon’s minority Christians.

The 1932 census constituted the basis for an unwritten 1943 national pact that reserved the presidency for a Maronite, the position of prime minister for a Sunni Muslim, and the parliament speaker’s job for a Shiite Muslim.

Neither Israel nor Hezbollah have commented on Safieddine’s fate.

However, Gulf media, including Saudi Arabia’s Al Hadath TV, cited Israeli security sources as saying he had been killed in the bombing of Beirut’s southern suburbs.

Al-Hadath, a Saudi news channel, quoted sources as saying the bombing’s intensity left “no possibility of survival.”

A Lebanese security source said Safieddine has been out of contact.

This article was reprinted with permission from James Dorsey’s Substack, The Turbulent World.

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